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In this paper we seek to contribute to the literature on competition and 
innovation by focusing on individual firms within the U.S. banking industry in the 
period 1984-2004. We measure innovation by estimating technology gaps and find 
evidence of an inverted-U relationship between competition and the technology gaps 
in banking. This finding is robust over several different specifications and is 
consistent with theoretical and empirical work by Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, 
and Howitt (2005b). The optimal amount of innovation requires a slightly positive 
mark up. Also, we find that the U.S. banking industry as a whole has consolidated 
beyond this optimal innovation level and that state-level interstate banking 
deregulation has lowered innovation. 
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Seminal work by Schumpeter (1942) posits that product market competition discour-
ages innovation by diminishing monopoly rents. By contrast, Aghion, Harris, Howitt,
and Vickers (2001) assert that competition may foster innovation as ﬁrms attempt to es-
cape competition. 1 Supporting this conjecture, some empirical studies ﬁnd an inverted-
U pattern between competition and innovation (e.g., Scherer, 1967; Levin and Mowrey,
1985). In an attempt to reconcile theory and evidence, Aghion and Grifﬁth (2005) and
Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Grifﬁth, and Howitt (2005b) propose a theoretical model that
is able to explain an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation,
wherein an escape competition effect initially dominates until competition reaches a
sufﬁcient level at which the rent dissipation effect thereafter prevails. 2
The present paper contributes to the competition/innovation literature in the follow-
ing ways. First, we extend this literature from the manufacturing sector to the (ﬁnancial)
services sector. Because a well-functioning ﬁnancial sector is crucial to the economy, it
is important to understand its innovation dynamics. Second, we introduce a new in-
novation measure. Instead of using traditional innovation outputs (e.g., patents which
are mostly relevant to manufacturing), we focus on banks’ ability to minimize costs
through innovations. Following earlier work by Hayami and Ruttan (1970), Mundlak
and Hellinghausen (1982), and Lau and Yotopoulos (1989), we estimate and envelope
annual minimum cost frontiers to create a metafrontier. The distance to the metafrontier
constituteseachbank’stechnologygap,whichisclosedifthebankmanagestoinnovate.
Third, our innovation measure enables us to derive and estimate the model of Aghion
et al. (2005b) at the ﬁrm-level for a single industry experiencing historic structural and
competitive changes during our sample period. By focusing on a single industry, we
avoid the assumption that the competition/innovation relationship is the same across
industries. Fourth, our empirical analyses provide detailed evidence on the effects of
interstate banking deregulation aimed at increasing competition in ﬁnancial services.
Fifth, and last, we examine the impact of bank consolidation on their innovation behav-
ior.
Drivenbyglobalization,technologicalchange,deregulation,andotherforces,theU.S.
banking industry has experienced dramatic changes in structure and competition (Jones
and Critchﬁeld, 2005). From 1984 to 2004, the industry consolidated from over 14,000
banks to around 7,500 banks (Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise, 1995; Berger, Demsetz, and
Strahan, 1999). Concomitantly, the average size of banks grew as banks with assets to-
taling more than $10 billion increased their share of industry assets from 30 percent
to over 70 percent (Rhoades, 2000). 3 A major concern is that continuing consolidation
will result in less competition. For example, Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) ﬁnd that, in
banking markets that are highly concentrated, nonﬁnancial ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly less
access to credit. On the positive side, ﬁnancial development is believed to foster efﬁ-
cient allocation of capital, improved risk sharing, and possibly a higher savings rate
1 See literature reviews by Kamien and Schwartz (1982) and Symeonidis (1996).
2 The model is also able to explain positive or negative effects of competition on innovation. Their empirical
evidence for manufacturing industries in the U.K. tends to support the hypothesis of an inverted-U pattern.
3 Similar consolidation trends have occurred in the European Union, United Kingdom, Japan, and other
countries around the world (Carletti et al., 2007).
2that can boost economic growth (Pagano, 1993; Levine, 2004). Empirical studies con-
ﬁrm the importance of ﬁnancial development in enhancing growth (Levine et al., 2000;
Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine, 1997; King and Levine, 1993). Relevant to our purpose,
innovations in the banking sector are an important channel through which ﬁnancial de-
velopment affects economic growth (Frame and White, 2004).
Consistent with Aghion and Grifﬁth (2005), based on a large sample of U.S. banks
from the sample period 1984-2004, we ﬁnd evidence of an inverted-U relationship be-
tween competition and technology gaps in banking. This ﬁnding is robust over several
different speciﬁcations and supports theoretical and empirical work by Aghion et al.
(2005b). The optimal amount of innovation requires a slightly positive markup. Explor-
ing further, we ﬁnd that the U.S. banking industry as a whole has consolidated beyond
this optimal innovation level and that interstate banking deregulation has lowered in-
novation through its effect on competition.
Section 2 provides a brief overview of studies on ﬁnancial innovation in the U.S.
banking industry. Section 3 describes the theoretical model developed by Aghion et al.
(2005b) to explain the inverted-U pattern. Section 4 overviews the data and methodol-
ogy. Section 5 empirically investigates the existence of an inverted-U relationship, dis-
cusses model robustness, examines the impact of interstate banking deregulation, and
considers whether the consolidation process has gone too far. Section 6 concludes.
2. Financial innovation in the U.S. banking industry
Deregulation of prices, products, and geographic restrictions on permissible banking
activities over the past 25 years has increased the contribution of market forces to ﬁ-
nancial innovation in the banking industry. In this regard, Vives (2001) observes that
deregulation and ﬁnancial innovations, including advances in information technology,
management techniques, and risk adjustment (e.g., derivatives, securitization, and off-
balance sheet activities), have substantially increased competition in U.S. and European
banking markets.
Frame and White (2004) comprehensively survey the literature on ﬁnancial innova-
tion by identifying 39 empirical studies. 4 They deﬁne ﬁnancial innovation as com-
prising activities that internally reduce bank costs and risks or externally better meet
the convenience and needs of customers. 5 They broadly group ﬁnancial innovations
into new products (e.g., automated teller machines or ATMs, credit and debit cards,
adjustable-rate mortgages, etc.), new production processes (e.g., electronic payments
and record keeping, information gathering and dissemination via computers and
4 By comparison, the second largest empirical literature in the ﬁeld of industrial organization (IO) is inno-
vation. Some of the reasons offered for this large difference in empirical research include: ﬁnancial services
are normally not included in research and development (R&D) budgets, patents on ﬁnancial services are rare,
data in banking accounting statements on innovation is limited, IO-trained economists are not knowledgeable
oftheﬁnancialservicessector,andfewﬁnancialeconomistarewelltrainedinIOandSchumpeterianhypothe-
ses. Here we seek to bridge the gap to some extent between IO economists and ﬁnance/banking economists
by empirically testing the relationship between competition and innovation in the U.S. banking industry.
5 Van Horne (1985) more broadly deﬁnes ﬁnancial innovation as making markets more operationally efﬁcient
or complete (i.e., the number and types of securities span all possible return and risk contingencies or states of
the world demanded by market participants). Also, Allen and Gale (1994) propose that ﬁnancial innovation
is associated with efﬁcient risk sharing due to the completion of markets.
3telecommunications, automated credit scoring models, securitization of loans, cross-
selling ﬁnancial services, etc.) and new organizational forms (e.g., internet-only banks,
interstate banking, diversiﬁed banks with traditional and nontraditional ﬁnancial ser-
vices, etc.). The practical signiﬁcance of these ﬁnancial innovations lies in their contribu-
tion to enhancing ﬁnancial intermediation, which allocates savings to investment and
thereby contributes to economic growth (see King and Levine (1993) and Levine (1997)).
Summarizing the literature, Frame and White (2004) conclude that the following fac-
tors tend to increase innovation in ﬁnancial services: regulation 6 , institution size 7 ,
higher individual education and income 8 , as well as ﬁrst-mover, cost, and reputational
advantages. 9 Frame and White (2004) also cite other papers on securities, process, and
organizational innovations, as well as the welfare effects of ﬁnancial innovations. They
conclude that, given the important role of ﬁnancial innovation in the ﬁnancial system
and the economy as a whole, there is considerable room for future research in this "rel-
atively untilled ﬁeld."
A separate branch of the banking literature examines technical change in the context
of cost and proﬁt efﬁciency analyses of ﬁnancial institutions. In this regard, Van Horne
(1985) observes that ﬁnancial innovations are motivated by operational inefﬁciencies.
Less efﬁcient ﬁnancial institutions are less competitive and, therefore, less likely to sur-
vive. Importantly, as Ross (1989) points out, institutions are the major agents of inno-
vation in ﬁnancial markets. In general, the efﬁciency literature tends to support the in-
stitution size effect in ﬁnancial innovation studies cited above. Elyasiani and Mehdian
(1990) and Hunter and Timme (1991) ﬁnd that larger banks experienced greater cost
efﬁciency gains compared to small banks in the 1980s. 10 Humphrey (1993) ﬁnds that
large banks had more technical change than small banks in the late 1970s. Also, Berger
and Mester (1997) ﬁnd that while large banks had decreasing cost efﬁciency over time,
they exhibited increasing proﬁt efﬁciency compared to small banks in the 1980s and
1990s. 11 Consistent with these studies, Wheelock and Wilson (1999) report greater tech-
nological gains among large banks in the 1980s and 1990s, which leads them to conclude
that competitive and regulatory changes in the banking industry have beneﬁted larger
over smaller banks. Lastly, Altunbas, Goddard, and Molyneux (1999) ﬁnd that larger
banks in 15 European countries experienced larger gains from technical change than
smaller banks in the period 1989-1996.
6 Lerner (2002) ﬁnds that changes in regulation motivate institutions to innovate new ﬁnancial services and
instruments in an attempt togain a competitive advantage. See also Ben-Horim andSilber (1977), Miller (1986)
Molyneux and Shamoukh (1996), and White (2000).
7 Size is repeatedly found to be linked to the likelihood of different ﬁnancial innovations (e.g., see internet
banking studies by Pennings and Harianto (1992), Sullivan (2000), Furst et al. (2002), and Nickerson and
Sullivan (2003)). Also, with respect to small business credit scoring, Frame et al. (2001), Chourchane et al.
(2002), Akhavein et al. (2005), and Berger et al. (2005) ﬁnd a link between institution size and innovation.
ATM studies by Hannan and McDowell (1984), Ingham and Thompson (1993), Saloner and Shepard (1995),
and Gourlay and Pentecost (2002) again ﬁnd a size effect.
8 See, for example, Carow and Staten (1999), Mantel (2000), and Mantel and McHugh (2001).
9 See Tufano (1989), Carow (1999b), and Carow (1999a).
10 However, Hunter and Timme (1991) do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences between large and small banks in
terms of technical change.
11 Similarly, Berger and Mester (2003) report decreasing cost productivity but increasing proﬁt productivity
among U.S. banks in the period 1991-1997.
4While the above studies ﬁnd that institution size is positively related to ﬁnancial in-
novation in line with Schumpeter’s hypothesis, few studies have attempted to link ﬁ-
nancial innovation and competition. Based on a sample of about 3,800 U.S. commercial
banks in the period 1971-1979, Hannan and McDowell (1984) report evidence that the
likelihood of ATM adoption is positively related to bank size, market concentration (i.e.,
three-ﬁrm concentration ratios in SMSAs or counties), and membership in a bank hold-
ing company. They infer that Schumpeter’s hypothesis is supported by these empirical
results. Chourchane, Nickerson, and Sullivan (2002) employ both simple bivariate and
multivariate logit analyses to examine the competitive effects of internet banking for
about 1,600 U.S. commercial banks in 1999. Unlike Hannan and McDowell, they ﬁnd
that the market concentration of competitive rivals lowers the likelihood of banks en-
tering internet banking markets. Also, faced with uncertain demand, larger banks are
more likely to enter internet banking than smaller banks, who prefer to delay their in-
vestment decision until larger banks have committed assets to the technological change.
Another study by Mantel and McHugh (2001) considers the question of whether, given
regulatory oversight of consumer protection issues, there is sufﬁcient competition and
innovation in consumer electronic payments, including credit cards, debit cards, e-cash,
and smartcards. Theyconclude thatprivate sectorefforts toachieve adequateconsumer
safety are as effective as regulatory intervention. Also, ﬁnancial innovation in electronic
consumer payments would increase to a greater extent due to market forces compared
to regulation. Finally, Akhavein, Frame, and White (2005) test for the impact of market
competition on the adoption of small business credit scoring for a sample of 96 large
U.S. banks in 1997. Like prior studies, bank organization size is positively related to ear-
lier adoption of credit scoring methods. However, market concentration as measured by
an average Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index (HHI) across local geographic markets is not
signiﬁcant. Overall, these studies yield mixed evidence on the link between competition
and innovation but conﬁrm larger banks are innovation leaders.
Other studies posit a variety of theoretical predictions concerning innovation and ﬁ-
nancial services. Van Horne (1985) conjectures that uncertainty about regulations, tax
laws, inﬂation, international events, and technology will lead to a continuing stream
of ﬁnancial innovations. Boot and Thakor (1997) theorize that a universal banking sys-
tem comprised of joint commercial and investment banks will produce less innovation
than functionally-separated ﬁnancial institutions due to adverse spillover effects of (for
example) securities innovations on commercial banking proﬁts. However, they argue
that in mixed ﬁnancial systems with both universal and functionally-separate institu-
tions, large universal banks will have a competitive advantage to inﬂuence changes in
regulations that favor ﬁnancial innovations in which scope economies are required. 12
Related work by Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2000) theorizes that larger investment
banks will be more likely to innovate new ﬁnancial services due to larger market shares
with greater revenue incentives. Smaller banks have less incentive to innovate but are
expected to be more aggressive than large banks in their introduction strategy (e.g., at-
tracting large bank customers). Another study by Hauswald and Marquez (2003) theo-
reticallyproposesthatﬁnancialinnovationininformationprocessinganddissemination
can change competition in the banking industry (see also Wilhelm (2001)). Advances in
12 The stakeholder capture theory proposes that some agents can sway public policy decisions in their favor
(e.g., see Kroszner and Strahan (1999)).
5information technology that improve information processing capabilities of banks will
tend to decrease competition as some banks gain an information advantage over other
banks.Ontheotherhand,ifinformationdisseminationisincreasedbyinformationtech-
nology innovations, competition will increase due to widespread access to proprietary
information that levels the playing ﬁeld. They conclude that the relative importance of
these two information effects is an empirical question.
In sum, consistent with empirical studies cited above, different theories predict a
variety of competition/innovation relationships for ﬁnancial services, in addition to a
greater likelihood of ﬁnancial innovation by larger institutions.
3. The Model
This section applies the model developed by Aghion et al. (2005b) to the banking in-
dustry. The model is used to derive the "escape competition effect" (positive effect of
competition on innovation) and the "Schumpeterian effect" (negative effect of compe-
tition on innovation) and subsequently explain how the balance between these effects
generates an inverted-U relationship. While Aghion et al. model an economy and de-
rive the average ﬂow of innovations for intermediate sectors, we apply their model to
the banking industry and derive the average ﬂow of innovations for a ﬁrm in a geo-
graphical banking market. Since their model is well-known, we only provide a brief
description of our banking industry application.
The Aghion et al. model assumes that there is a continuum (with total mass equal to
one) of identical consumers in the economy that use a constant intertemporal discount
rate r and have the utility function u(yt) = lnyt. Here we extend their model to the
banking industry. The consumption good of banking institutions (yt) is ﬁnancial ser-
vices produced using input services from a continuum of intermediate sectors in the
production function lnyt =
R 1
0 lnxjtdj, where xjt is an aggregate of two intermediate
goods A and B produced by two banks (duopoly) in sector j. In our model each inter-
mediate sector represents a geographical (e.g., local) banking market. 13 The subutility
function is deﬁned as xj = xAj + xBj. Consumers maximize the subutility function with
respect to their (normalized) budget constraint. 14
Banks only use labor as an input at the (exogenous) normalized wage rate w(t) = 1,
and it is assumed that the production function exhibits constant returns. The unit cost
of production is independent of the quantity produced, such that the unit cost structure
becomes ci = g ki, where g ki is the unit labor requirement of bank i, g is the size
of an innovation (assumed to be larger than one), and ki is the technological level of
a bank. Hence, innovations lower the unit cost due to decreasing the required units of
labor per unit of output. The relative costs of a bank depend only on the technological
gap. The maximum technological gap in a sector is assumed to be one (m = 1), and
technological advances occur through step-by-step innovations instead of leapfrogging
13 Competition in banking occurs at a local level for many products and services (e.g., see Pilloff (1999) and
Berger et al. (1999)).
14 The income of consumers is normalized to unity by using the expenditure as the numeraire for prices in
each period.
6models. 15 The R&D cost function y(n) = n2/2 is expressed in units of labor n. Further-
more, a Poisson process for innovations is assumed and leaders or neck-and-neck banks
move one technological step ahead with a Poisson hazard rate of n (R&D intensity) by
spending y(n) on R&D. The laggard bank moves ahead with the hazard rate n + h if
it puts effort into R&D, where h is a help factor that represents R&D spillovers or the
ability to copy the technology of a leader. The R&D intensities of leading banks, lag-
gard banks, and neck-and-neck banks are n1, n 1, and n0, respectively. By assumption,
leaders do not innovate (n1 = 0), as laggard banks can copy their previous technology
immediately (so that the maximum gap remains one).
Product market competition is modeled by the ability of banks to collude. It is as-
sumed that banks are able to collude if they are operating in a leveled bank market
segment but cannot collude if the bank market segment is unleveled. It is important to
note that multi-market contact may facilitate collusive behavior. 16 We assume that a
bank may face another bank in several markets, but it does not face the same bank in all
markets. Furthermore, it is assumed that a bank facing one competitor in several mar-
kets has the same technology gap in these markets. 17 The proﬁts of laggard banks and
leaders are p 1 = 0 and p1 = 1   g 1, respectively. Laggard banks make zero proﬁt,
as leaders capture the market and earn a proﬁt equal to its revenue (normalized to one
due to the income in the budget constraint) minus the costs (equal to the inverse of the
innovation parameter g). The proﬁt of neck-and-neck banks ranges from zero to one-
half of the proﬁts of a technological leader. The inability to collude leads to zero proﬁts,
as banks are assumed to be in Bertrand competition with undifferentiated products and
similar unit costs, p0 = #p1,# 2 [0, 1
2]. Competition is parameterized by D = 1   # and
equals the incremental proﬁt of an innovating bank in a leveled market normalized by
the proﬁt of a leader.
Aghion et al. derive the research intensities and examine how they are affected by
changes in competition. It is assumed that the discount rate is zero (r = 0). The research
intensities of neck-and-neck banks and laggards are n0 =
p
h2 + 2Dp1   h and n 1 = q
h2 + n2
0 + 2p1   h   n0, respectively. 18 Differentiating these research intensities with
















n 1 + h + n0

< 0. (2)
15 It is impossible for laggard banks to surpass a technological leader by means of an innovation without
drawing even with this leader. See Aghion et al. (1997) for several appealing features of a model of step-by-
step innovation compared to the Schumpeterian leapfrogging models.
16 For example, it is possible to give a competitor a higher market share in one market to induce collusive
behavior, while using the other market for disciplining purposes.
17 Suppose that banks A and B are competitors in two local markets. If bank A is a technological leader in one
market, this bank can use its technological advantage in both markets. This assumption implies that markets
are either leveled or unleveled.
18 See Aghion et al. (2005b) for a derivation of equilibrium research intensities as well as escape competition
and Schumpeterian effects.
7Obviously, from the ﬁrst order condition in equation (1), the research intensity of a
neck-and-neck ﬁrm is positively affected by increases in the degree of competition (i.e.,
an escape-competition effect). Their innovation incentives increase with more compe-
tition, as their pre-innovation rents are reduced more than post-innovation rents. The
ﬁrst order condition in equation (2) shows that the research intensity of a laggard bank
decreases as competition increases (i.e., a Schumpeterian effect). The reason for this neg-
ative effect on innovation is that more competition reduces the rents that a laggard bank
can attain by innovating. Whether the escape competition or Schumpeterian effect dom-
inates depends on the fraction of leveled and unleveled sectors in the steady state, as
determined by the research intensities of laggards and neck-and-neck banks.
We diverge from Aghion et al. by examining how the average ﬂow of innovations
of a ﬁrm (as opposed to industry) changes with competition. The steady-state proba-
bilities that a market is leveled and unleveled are m0 and m1, respectively. During any
unit time interval, the steady-state probability that a market changes state (from lev-
eled to unleveled or vice versa) is an aggregate of the probability of being a certain
type of market times the Poisson hazard rate that ﬁrms move ahead. For unleveled and
leveled markets this probability is m1(n 1 + h) and 2m0n0, respectively. The condition
m1(n 1 + h) = 2m0n0 must hold in the steady-state, as the fraction of leveled and un-
leveled markets must remain unchanged. The average ﬂow of innovations for a ﬁrm in
an intermediate sector is: 19
I = m0n0 + m1 (n 1 + h) = 1.5m1 (n 1 + h) =
3n0 (n 1 + h)
2n0 + n 1 + h
. (3)
According to this equation, innovations for a ﬁrm in a certain (geographical) market
follows an inverted-U pattern. 20 The intuition is straightforward. If the degree of com-
petition is initially low, neck-and-neck banks earn high proﬁts and have little incentive
to innovate. By contrast, laggard banks have relatively more incentive to innovate due
to low initial proﬁts (i.e., zero in the model) but high potential proﬁts if they manage
to catch up with a technological leader. We can infer that banks will leave their sta-
tus as a neck-and-neck (laggard) bank relatively slowly (rapidly). Consequently, a bank
will be a neck-and-neck bank most of the time, such that the escape-competition effect
dominates. If there is not much competition in a market, increased competition should
lead to a higher average innovation rate. The reverse is true in the case of high initial
competition. Now laggard banks do not have much incentive to innovate due to little
gain after a successful innovation. However, neck-and-neck banks have relatively more
incentive to innovate due to large incremental potential proﬁt. These outcomes imply
that banks will leave their status as a neck-and-neck (laggard) bank relatively rapidly
(slowly). In this scenario a bank will be a laggard bank most of the time, such that the
Schumpeterian effect dominates and the leader never innovates. Hence, if the degree
of competition is initially high, increased competition should lead to a lower average
innovation rate.
19 Since two neck-and-neck ﬁrms are trying to gain a technological lead, the average ﬂow of innovations in an
intermediate sector is equal to I = 2m0n0 + m1 (n 1 + h).
20 See Aghion et al. (2005b) for the proof at the industry level.
84. Data and Methodology
4.1. Data
Our dataset contains individual bank data over the period 1984-2004. Data are gath-
ered from the Call Reports of Income and Condition provided by the Federal Reserve
System. The Call Reports include complete balance sheet and income statement data for
each bank. All data are expressed in 1984 U.S. dollars.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Price cost margin 151,476 0.179 0.090 -0.993 0.964
Total assets per in millions of USD 151,476 458.740 7416.978 1.067 967,365
Risk (Equity/Total Assets) 151,476 0.096 0.034 7.36e-05 0.998
Salary expenses per fte in thousands of USD 151,476 35.143 12.756 0.048 537.160
The descriptive statistics are based on the sample of the preferred speciﬁcation in Table 3 (speciﬁcation 2).
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the price cost margin, total assets, equity
ratio, and average wage per fte-employee. The number of banks per year ranges from
about 7,500 to around 14,000.
4.2. Estimating technology gaps
To examine the relationship between competition and innovation at the ﬁrm-level, we
need a ﬁrm-speciﬁc measure of innovation that is appropriate for the banking indus-
try. In order to distinguish the most innovative ﬁrms from the least innovative ﬁrms,
the measure should be ordinal. Traditional innovation measures, such as patents or
R&D expenditures, are not obvious measures for service sectors such as banking (Frame
and White, 2004). Moreover, these traditional measures have limitations (Kamien and
Schwartz, 1982; Acs and Audretsch, 1987; Geroski, 1990; Griliches, 1990). For example,
not all innovations are patented and R&D expenditures may systematically understate
the research activity of small ﬁrms.
For these reasons we propose to use changes in the estimated technology gap of ﬁrms
as a measure of innovation. Speciﬁcally, changes in the technology gap represent rel-
ative improvements in technology sets, which in turn are affected by innovations. In
his work on technology gap theory, Posner (1961) introduced the idea that temporary
monopoly proﬁts can be appropriated, based on a technological lead, in an international
trade context. Given the assumption that technology is not a free and universally avail-
able good, Posner argued that, even though technology might be important for trade
in some sectors and not in others, innovations made in one country (in technology in-
tensive sectors) would beneﬁt that country as long as the lead could be maintained.
That is, a country will have ample ﬁrst-mover advantages in a particular sector until
9other countries have imitated the innovation. Krugman (1986) extends the concept of
technology gaps to international trade and trade-induced learning. 21
Studies by Battese and Rao (2002), Battese, Rao, and O’Donnell (2004) and O’Donnell,
Rao, and Battese (2008) use stochastic frontiers to estimate technology gaps. Particularly
relevant to the present paper, Bos and Schmiedel (2007) estimate technology gap ra-
tios for commercial banks. They test whether banks in European Union (E.U.) countries
share a common minimum cost (and maximum proﬁt) frontier. To do so they compare
country-speciﬁc cost frontiers to an E.U.-wide meta frontier. The meta frontier is esti-
mated as the envelope around country-speciﬁc frontiers and, therefore, represents the
potential available technology. The relative distance between this meta frontier and the
country-speciﬁc frontiers is the technology gap ratio.





Frontier t = 2




Figure 1 illustrates the rationale for our technology gap ratio with a simple example
based on cost minimization with two inputs (X1, X2) and a single output (Y). In this
example there are two annual frontiers at time t = 1 and time t = 2. Each frontier
represents the minimum cost curve for a certain level of output for that year. That is,
it captures the appropriate minimum cost frontier at a speciﬁc time t. 22 The dashed
line in Figure 1 represents the minimum cost frontier over the whole period, or meta
frontier. Innovation results in a lower gap between the annual minimum cost frontier
and the meta frontier, where the latter is an envelope function of stochastic frontiers in
21 See also related studies by Dosi et al. (1994), Grossman and Helpman (1994), Targetti and Foti (1997), Fager-
berg and Verspagen (2002), and Acemoglu et al. (2007).
22 We borrow the concept of appropriate technology from Basu and Weil (1998).
10each time period. The technology gap ratio measures the difference between currently
available technology and potentially available technology over the whole period with
values between zero and one (i.e., the ﬁrm is on the meta frontier). The cost efﬁciency
of a ﬁrm located at point E at time t = 1 is OD/OE. If the ﬁrm is at point C at t = 2,
its efﬁciency is OB/OC. At t = 1 the ﬁrm faces a technology gap of OA/OD, which
narrows to OA/OB at t = 2 as the ﬁrm improves its technology set.
In this paper we follow Bos and Schmiedel (2007) and estimate annual cost frontiers
for U.S. banks. We then estimate the envelope around these annual frontiers. We em-
ploy stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to estimate translog cost frontiers. 23 Banks are
assumed to minimize total costs (TCit), operate in perfectly competitive input markets,
and produce inputs and outputs in line with the so-called "intermediation approach."
We therefore deﬁne an output vector Y consisting of three outputs: loans, investments,
and off-balance sheet items. Output quantities are year-end stocks. Banks choose input
quantities given factor costs. We deﬁne an input price vector W consisting of three input
prices: the price of ﬁxed assets, price of labor, and price of borrowed funds. We calcu-
late inputprices asfactor payments divided by inputquantities. Theprice of ﬁxedassets
equals depreciation over ﬁxed assets, the price of labor equals personnel expenses over
the number of fte-employees, and the price of borrowed funds equals interest expenses
over total borrowed funds. Following Hughes and Mester (1993), we include an equity
to total assets ratio Z to account for different risk proﬁles of banks.
For each year t, we can write the cost frontier as: 24
TCit = f(wit,yit,zit)evit+uit, (4)
where the random noise component v is i.i.d. N(0,sv), and the inefﬁciency u is i.i.d.
Nj(m,su)j. Since cost inefﬁcient banks operate above the efﬁcient frontier, the latter term
is added to random deviations, which results in a composed error of the form #it =
nit + uit. Firm-speciﬁc estimates of the inefﬁciency term are obtained from the expected
value of uit conditional on total error eit (i.e., E(uitjeit)). Subsequently, estimates of cost
efﬁciency are obtained from:
ˆ CEit = [exp(  ˆ uit)], (5)
where efﬁcient banks operate on the minimum cost frontier ( ˆ CEit = 1), and inefﬁcient
banksoperateabovethefrontier.Estimatingequation(4)foreachyear t providesannual
minimum cost frontiers. For the period 1984-2004, 21 annual frontiers are estimated. We
seek to measure movements of this frontier over time without the confounding inﬂu-
ence of efﬁciency changes (i.e., movements towards this frontier). 25 We therefore use
23 Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) provide an excellent discussion of the development and application of SFA
to efﬁciency measurement.
24 We use a translog functional form and impose homogeneity of degree one in input prices and symmetry.
25 Conventional studies have applied stochastic frontiers to measure technical change by including a time
trend variable and interaction terms in the translog speciﬁcation (Altunbas et al., 1999). As noted by Baltagi
and Grifﬁn (1988), one of the problems with this approach is that pure technical change is assumed to be
linearly increasing or decreasing over time. In this respect, Baltagi and Grifﬁn (1988) recommend the use of
time dummies interacted with the other variables in the translog speciﬁcation. Although this approach results
in a general index of technical change that is indeed more ﬂexible, possible correlation between efﬁciency and
technical change may still affect the latter.
11parameter estimates for the annual cost frontier and produce estimates of the technol-








jlnf(wit,yit,zit)   lnfmeta(wit,yit,zit)j,s.t. lnfmeta()  lnf().
(6)
Equation (6) minimizes the distance between the meta frontier and the annual frontiers,
with the constraint that the latter are not below the former. 26 Now we can measure the










= CEit TGRit, (7)
where TGRit is the ﬁrm’s technology gap ratio consistent with the simple example in
Figure 1. We use this measure to gauge each ﬁrm’s technology gap. Table 2 shows the
descriptive statistics for the estimated technology gap ratios.
Table 2
Technology gap ratios
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Technology gap ratio 151,476 0.989 0.029 1.07e-08 1 .000
The descriptive statistics are based on the sample of the preferred speciﬁcation in Table 3 (speciﬁ-
cation 2).
We can now relate the role innovation plays in the model of Aghion et al. to the tech-
nology gap ratio derived in equation (7) and depicted in Figure 1. Recall that some of
the crucial assumptions of their model include the fact that leaders do not innovate,
and that the maximum gap remains one. In addition, innovations are expected to lower
the unit cost of production, and laggards cannot surpass the leader without ﬁrst draw-
ing even. Clearly, the technology gap ratio we have derived here is in line with each of
these assumptions. A leader will be on the (annual) cost frontier, even if that shifts, as
in Figure 1. Throughout, his TGR will remain 1. Likewise, a laggard can close the tech-
nology gap, by lowering his cost, and moving towards the cost frontier. Summing up,
the technology gap ratio as a measure of innovation is closely aligned with the concept
of innovation as described by Aghion et al..
4.3. Measuring competition
We follow Aghion et al. (2005b) by using the price cost margin (viz., Lerner index, or







26 Details concerning our estimation procedure are available on request from the authors.
12where Pit is the proﬁt of a bank, Fit represents ﬁxed costs, and Rit denotes sales. The
price cost margin is calculated by dividing the net income after taxes and extraordinary
items plus expenses of premises and ﬁxed assets by total non-interest income plus total
interest income. The competition measure ranges between zero and two after removal
of outliers. 27
4.4. Empirical speciﬁcations and estimation procedures
We present several empirical speciﬁcations based on the following general model:
TGRit = b1Cit + b2C2
it + g0Zit + ai + #it, (9)
where the technology gap ratio is the dependent variable, Cit is the competition vari-
able, g0 is a 1xn parameter vector, and Zit is a nx1 vector of control variables. A squared
term for the competition variable is included to account for the inverted-U relation-
ship between competition and innovation proposed by Aghion et al.. Taking the ﬁrst-
differences of equation (9) to eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity ai gives:
DTGRit = b1DCit + b2DC2
it + g0DZit + D#it. (10)
A common problem in competition-innovation studies is the difﬁculty associated
with ﬁnding suitable instruments for the competition variable. The competition variable
is endogenous due to reverse causality with the innovation variable. Even though many
papers do not control for the endogeneity of competition, they interpret the results as
a causal effect of competition on innovation. The danger in interpreting the results in
this way is that innovation may also have an effect on competition (e.g., if innovation
reduces competition) and hence leads to biased coefﬁcient estimates. For this reason it
is impossible to draw conclusions about causal relationships without using exogenous
instruments. To deal with the endogenous competition variable, it is necessary to ﬁnd
relevant instruments (i.e., correlated with the endogenous variable) that are not corre-
lated with the error term (instrument exogeneity). We use the two-step efﬁcient gener-
alized method of moments estimator (GMM), where lags of these endogenous variables
in levels are used as instruments for the endogenous variables in ﬁrst-differences. 28 The
lag structure will depend on the order of serial correlation in the residuals. If there is no
serial correlation in the residuals (in levels), lags from period t-2 (onwards) can be used
as instruments. However, if there is ﬁrst-order serial correlation (in the residual in lev-
27 Outliers were removed after visual inspection of scatter plots of the technology gap ratio against the price
cost margin. A range between -1 and 1 for the price cost margin was considered to be reasonable. Therefore,
the analysis excludes 1,324 observations (i.e., less than 1% of the total amount of observations). Some authors
choose to remove negative price cost margins, but this approach creates a bias in the results as only ﬁrms with
positive proﬁts are considered. Our empirical ﬁndings were robust to different thresholds.
28 The OLS estimations are only performed for exploratory purposes, as the OLS estimator gives biased and
inconsistent estimates of causal effects in the presence of endogenous regressors. GMM has some efﬁciency
gains compared to the traditional IV/2SLS estimator. For example, the efﬁcient GMM estimator utilizes an op-
timal weighting matrix that minimizes the asymptotic variance of the estimator. Also, GMM is more efﬁcient
than the 2SLS estimator in the presence of heteroskedasticity.
13els), lags from period t-3 must be used. An important assumption is that these lags are
not correlated with the disturbance term. 29
Additionally, we employ a model speciﬁcation in which interstate banking deregu-
lation at the state level is used as an instrument. Before the late 1970s, restrictions on
interstate banking protected banks from outside competition. Deregulation concerning
interstate banking unleashed competitive forces by allowing banks to enter new mar-
kets and pose a threat to incumbent banks (Stiroh and Strahan, 2003). This regime shift
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 from the year in which states entered into
an interstate banking agreement with other states, and 0 before this year. 30 However, it
is questionable whether such policy reforms in the banking sector are suitable instru-
ments for competition. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) argue that several technological
and ﬁnancial innovations inﬂuenced the deregulation process by affecting the lobby be-
havior of banks. In this regard, these authors cite some speciﬁc technologies (e.g., the
introduction of the ATM) that spurred banks’ efforts to seek deregulation. Even though
the technology gap ratio captures a broad spectrum of implemented innovations, the
endogeneity of this regime shift due to its concomitant reverse causality with techno-
logical developments remains questionable.
One empirical drawback of neglecting control variables in equation (9) is that other
factors that are correlated with competition can inﬂuence innovation. Therefore, we in-
troduce a model speciﬁcation with several control variables, which allows for the possi-
bility that the elements of the parameter vector g0 are nonzero. Our control variables are
as follows: equity divided by total assets, ﬁrm size in terms of total assets, and the aver-
age wage per fte-employee. Equity to total assets is an inverse measure of debt pressure.
Aghionetal.(2005a)arguethatdebtpressureispositivelyrelatedtoinnovation,asﬁrms
increase innovation to escape the threat of bankruptcy. The relationship between ﬁrm
size and innovation is a Schumpeterian hypothesis. Plausible explanations of a positive
relationship between ﬁrm size and innovation are potential scale economies in R&D
and diversiﬁcation beneﬁts that lower risk (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982). Lastly, the
variable average wage per full-time equivalent employee proxies for labor productivity
and, therefore, is positively related to innovation.
We also estimate equation (10) for two different time periods to examine the stability
of the inverted-U pattern over time. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efﬁciency Act of 1994 eliminated the interstate banking restrictions at the national level
and is used to demarcate two periods: 1984-1993 and 1994-2004.
5. Results
This section describes the empirical results. First, we test for the inverted-U relation-
ship.Second,weexaminetherobustnessofourresultsbycomparingthemtoalternative
29 An argument against the exogeneity of these lags is that the dependent variable in the current period may
reﬂect expectations in the past. If behavior in the past is based on expectations of the future, these lags as in-
struments are not exogenous. For example, the technology gap ratio in the current period may reﬂect expecta-
tions concerning the technology gap in previous periods, and this expectation may have affected competitive
behavior in the past.
30 See Stiroh and Strahan (2003) for an overview of the deregulation year for each state.
14speciﬁcations. 31 Third, we investigate how the interstate banking deregulation process,
which was aimed in part at enhancing competition, affected innovation. Fourth, and
last, we evaluate the effect of the consolidation process on innovation in U.S. banking.
5.1. Is there an inverted-U relationship?
Our main focus is to examine the effect of competition on innovation in U.S. banking.
Table 3 shows the results of the basic speciﬁcation and the preferred speciﬁcation.
Table 3
Competition and technology gaps
Based on equation (10) Speciﬁcation (1) Speciﬁcation (2)









Optimal price cost margin 21.800% 5.200%
Sargan-Hansen J statistic 1.064
(0.588)
Observations 198,785 151,476
Standard errors (between parentheses) are robust against heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation with signiﬁcance at the following levels: * – 0.10, ** –
0.05, and *** – 0.01. The p-values are reported for the Arellano-Bond serial
correlation test. The chi-squared statistic and the p-value are reported for the
endogeneity test and the Hansen test. The endogeneity test (difference-in-
Sargan) is performed on the competition variables.
We ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant (individually and jointly) inverted-U relationship
between competition and the technology gap ratio in both model speciﬁcations. 32 The
basic model speciﬁcation shows the estimation results without dealing with the endo-
geneity of the competition variable. The optimal price cost margin is around 21.8%.
However, the OLS estimator yields biased and inconsistent estimates of the causal ef-
fect of the regressor on an outcome in the presence of endogenous regressors. The com-
petition variable and its squared term are endogenous from a theoretical point of view
31 We also performed a Kernel regression to allow for more ﬂexibility in the relationship between competi-
tion and the technology gap ratio. The Kernel regression also shows evidence of an inverted-U relationship
between competition and innovation.
32 The p-value of the F-test is zero in both speciﬁcations.
15due to reverse causality with innovation. 33 The second model speciﬁcation shows the
results with lagged values in levels of the competition variable and its squared term. 34
Since the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation indicates ﬁrst-order autocorrelation in
the residuals in levels, the lags are taken from periods t-3 and t-4. 35 As such, lags from
period t-2 cannot be used. According to the Sargan-Hansen test, the joint null hypothe-
sis that the instruments are valid cannot be rejected. 36 The optimal price cost margin in
speciﬁcation (2) is around 5.2%. 37
Based on the second (preferred) model speciﬁcation, Figure 2 shows the empirical
relationship between the technology gap ratio and competition measure. These ﬁndings
are consistent with the theoretical and empirical results of Aghion et al. (2005b) and
empirical work of Hashmi (2007). Aghion et al. use U.K. data (industry-averages) over
the period 1973-1994 and ﬁnd an optimal price cost margin around 6.0% after using
policy instruments to deal with the endogeneity of competition (see Aghion et al. 2005b,
Table 1, speciﬁcation 4, p. 708). Hashmi (2007) also conducts an industry-level analysis
based on data from publicly-traded manufacturing ﬁrms in the U.S. over the period
1970-1994. Instead of using an instrumental variable approach, he uses the ﬁrst lag of
the competition variable and the squared term directly. His empirical results indicate an
optimal price cost margin around 22.9% (see Hashmi (2007), Table 2 (ﬁrst speciﬁcation),
p.13).
To examine the robustness of our results, we check whether an inverse-U relation-
ship exists for a number of alternative model speciﬁcations. Table 4 gives the results.
As shown there, model speciﬁcation (3) includes several control variables, and lagged
values of the competition variable (from periods t-3 and t-4) are used as instruments.
An inverted-U relationship between competition and technology gap ratio is again ob-
33 We also performed the Hausman-Wu endogeneity test based on speciﬁcation (2) to examine the endo-
geneity of the competition variable and its squared term. The endogeneity test showed that the competition
variable should be treated as an endogenous regressor (i.e., the p-value of the F-test was zero).
34 An important drawback of the two-step efﬁcient GMM estimator is that the standard errors are downward
biased in small samples. Windmeijer (2005) proposes a ﬁnite sample corrected estimate of the variance. The
corrected variance leads to more accurate inference in small samples. There is also a ﬁnite sample bias of the
GMM estimator itself. Therefore, the correction of the variance is only useful for improving inference when
the GMM estimator does not contain a large ﬁnite sample bias. However, these issues may not be a problem
with the dataset used in this paper, as there is on average about 11,000 banks in the sample over a period of
21 years. As a robustness check, we performed regressions with the Windmeijer correction. As expected, the
correction had a negligible effect on the standard errors.
35 This serial correlation test is based on the examination of residuals in ﬁrst differences. Testing for ﬁrst-order
serial correlation in levels is based on testing for second-order serial correlation in ﬁrst differences.
36 We performed an instrument relevance test based on the joint signiﬁcance of the instruments. The F-
statistics for the regressions with the competition variable and its squared term as a dependent variable are
905.16 and 545.13, respectively. Since an F-statistic of 10 is often used as a rule of thumb to examine instrument
relevance, we conclude that the instruments are relevant.
37 Translated into 1984 dollars, a one percentage point decrease in the price cost margin results on average in
approximately $627,000,000 (1984 dollars) lower costs for the whole banking sector (evaluated at the average
number of banks per year in the sample of about 11,000). This number is obtained by evaluating the marginal
effect of the competition variable on the technology gap ratio at the average price cost margin. The marginal
effect on the technology gap ratio is translated into annual frontier dollar values evaluated at the average
metafrontier, average technology gap ratio, and the average technology gap ratio plus the marginal effect.
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tained after controlling for other factors that may affect this ratio. According to the
Sargan-Hansen test, the instruments are valid in this speciﬁcation. The optimal price
cost margin is around 5.8% and thus higher than the optimal markup from the second
speciﬁcation. The risk variable (equity divided by total assets) is signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. A decrease in the equity ratio is positively related to the technology gap ratio. This
ﬁnding is consistent with the theory of Aghion et al. (2005a) that more debt pressure
may lead to more innovation. Both ﬁrm size and the average wage per fte-employee are
not signiﬁcantly related to the technology gap ratio.
In model speciﬁcation (4) the lag structure of the instruments is changed by using
lags of the competition variable and its squared term from period t-3. A regime shift
associated with interstate banking deregulation in 1994 is added to the instrument set,
such that there is one over-identifying restriction. The instruments are valid based on
the Sargan-Hansen test. According to the Arellano-Bond serial correlation test, there is
no evidence of ﬁrst order serial correlation in the residuals in levels. Hence, it would
be appropriate to use the lag from period t-2 as an instrument also. We have chosen
lags from period t-3, as many speciﬁcations showed some evidence of ﬁrst-order serial
correlation and therefore contradicted the result from this test in speciﬁcation (4). We
ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant (individually and jointly) inverted-U relationship between
competition and the technology gap ratio, with an optimal markup of approximately
5.4%. Model speciﬁcations (5) and (6) show the results for time periods before and after
the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efﬁciency Act of 1994, respectively.
Again, the inverted-U pattern is robust in these two time periods.
17Table 4
Competition and technology gaps: alternative speciﬁcations
Based on equation (10) Speciﬁcation (3) Speciﬁcation (4) Speciﬁcation (5) Speciﬁcation (6)
Estimation procedure Two-step GMM Two-step GMM Two-step GMM Two-step GMM
Period 1984-2004 1984-2004 1984-1993 1994-2004
DCompetitionit 1.474*** 1.424*** 0.678*** 2.511***
(0.106) (0.069) (0.070) (0.180)
DCompetition2
it -0.783*** -0.753*** -0.336*** -1.369***





DAverage wage per fteit -5.88e-05
(5.74e-05)
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
AR(3) 0.795 0.814 0.798 0.899
Optimal price cost margin 5.800% 5.400% -0.007% 8.300%
Hansen J statistic 0.797 2.089 1.151 1.071
(0.671) (0.148) (0.562) (0.585)
Observations 151,476 166,437 65,020 86,456
Standard errors (between parentheses) are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation with signiﬁcance
at the following levels: * – 0.10, ** – 0.05, and *** – 0.01. The p-values are reported for the Arellano-Bond serial
correlation test. The chi-squared statistic and p-value are reported for the endogeneity test and Hansen test. The
endogeneity test is performed on the ﬁrm size and competition variables.
5.2. How has the interstate banking deregulation affected competition in U.S. banking?
In model speciﬁcation (4) interstate banking deregulation in 1994 was used as an in-
strument for competition. 38 This dummy variable assumes that the effect of deregu-
lation was absorbed immediately in the competitive environment. However, if the dy-
namics are more complex, this assumption can lead to model misspeciﬁcation. To allow
for ﬂexibility in the response function, we construct a dummy variable for every two
consecutive years after the deregulation year. The response function is estimated by re-
gressing the competition variable on the full set of dummy variables that captures the
dynamic effects of deregulation: 39
38 We also estimated a speciﬁcation in which we regressed the technology gap ratio on the competition vari-
ables and the deregulation variable as a control variable. The deregulation variable was insigniﬁcant in this
speciﬁcation.





akDkst + ai + #it, (11)
where Cit is the competition variable, and Dkst is the deregulation variable that has
been in effect for period k in state s. Each period consists of two consecutive years start-
ing from year 1 until year 13. Only the last period consists of more than two years
and captures the effect of the deregulation from year 13 and thereafter in the post-
implementation period. Table 5 shows the results.
Table 5
Competition and the dynamic effect of interstate banking deregulation
Based on equation (11)
Estimation procedure OLS
DYears 1  2 -0.000
(0.001)
DYears 3  4 -0.003**
(0.001)
DYears 5  6 -0.007***
(0.002)
DYears 7  8 -0.024***
(0.002)
DYears 9  10 -0.026***
(0.002)
DYears 11  12 -0.029***
(0.002)
DYears 13  thereafter -0.037***
(0.002)
Observations 202,168
Standard errors (between parentheses) are
robust against heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation with the following signiﬁcance
levels: * – 0.10, ** – 0.05, and *** – 0.01.
Most regression coefﬁcients are negative and suggest that deregulation of interstate
banking had an adverse effect on competition. 40 We performed an F-test to investigate
whether the responses are homogenous over time. The null hypothesis that the slope
coefﬁcients are equal to each other is rejected at the 1% level. 41 A possible explanation
for the decrease in competition is that more multi-market contact (due to the interstate
banking deregulation) facilitated tacit collusion. These results are also consistent with
40 There seems to be no signiﬁcant effect in the ﬁrst two years after deregulation.
41 The p-value of the F-test is zero.
19the ﬁndings of Stiroh and Strahan (2003), who argue that the banking deregulations trig-
gered a reallocation of banking assets from low proﬁt to high proﬁt banks and resulted
in increased proﬁtability in the banking sector. Hence, the reallocation process in the
industry led to higher price cost margins on average. Figure 3 shows a clear downward
trend in the response of competition to interstate banking deregulation.
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Effect on competition 95% Confidence Interval
Thisevidencesuggeststhatthenegativecompetitiveeffectsoftheregimeshiftincreased
over time. Hence, interstate banking deregulation triggered a leftward movement of
competition in Figure 2. To make inferences about its effects on innovation, we need to
know the level of competition before deregulation. The average price cost margin before
the year of deregulation is 10.5%. This is higher than the optimal price cost margin in all
of the speciﬁcations, except for the ﬁrst speciﬁcation in which endogeneity problems are
not treated. In view of the inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation,
we infer that the technology gap ratio decreased on average after the deregulation of
interstate banking (i.e., the leftward movement begins left of the optimal point).
5.3. Has consolidation gone too far?
During the consolidation process, the number of banks declined and average bank
size increased. These trends have important implications for market structure and com-
petition in the U.S. banking industry. Figure 4 shows the development of the average
price cost margin and the number of banks over the sample period 1984-2004.






































































1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Number of banks Average Price Cost Margin
In this period the number of banks declined from 14,323 in 1984 to 7,548 in 2004,
while the average price cost margin increased from 9.3% in 1984 to 24.5% in 2004. The
average price cost margin in 1984 was already higher than the optimal markup in our
preferred speciﬁcation (or 5.2%) and most of our other model speciﬁcations (except for
the OLS results). However, the average price cost margin declined in some years in our
sample period. For example, the average price cost margin declined every year from
1993 at 19.8% to 2000 at 16.9%. This means that movements along the inverted-U re-
lationship were toward the optimal point that enhances innovation. Nevertheless, the
average price cost margins soared again in 2001 to 2004 from around 17.3% to approx-
imately 24.5%. This translates into a movement away from the optimal point, given
that banks were positioned on average to the left side of the inverted-U relationship
during the whole sample period. Thus, we ﬁnd that: (1) the consolidation process was
accompanied by a large increase in average price cost margins, and (2) U.S. banks are
on average not operating at the optimal point that enhances innovation.
6. Conclusion
The U.S. banking industry experienced historic structural and competitive changes
due to a consolidation wave over the past two decades. Contributing to the endoge-
nous growth theory and industrial organization literature, the present paper seeks to
examine the relationship between competition and innovation in U.S. banking. We also
investigate the effects of interstate banking deregulation and major consolidation on
bankcompetitionandinnovation.Todothisweestimatetechnologygapratiosobtained
21from meta frontier analyses of U.S. banks in the sample period 1984-2004.
Consistent with Aghion et al. (2005b) and others, our empirical results suggest an
inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation in the U.S. banking in-
dustry. This relationship is robust to alternative model speciﬁcations in which control
variables and different instruments are used, in addition to different sample periods.
We also ﬁnd that interstate banking deregulation negatively affected competition on
average. The downward trend in competition after this deregulation implies a leftward
movement along the inverted-U curve. Since banks were below (or left of) the optimal
level of competition in our sample period, interstate banking deregulation tended to
reduce innovation on average.
Importantly, our analyses show that the consolidation movement has been accompa-
nied by marked increases in the price cost margins of banks over time (e.g., from 9.3%
in 1984 to 24.5% in 2004). These margins are higher than the optimal price cost margins
in most of our model speciﬁcations. Given ongoing consolidation due to mergers and
acquisitions of troubled banks in the 2008-2009 ﬁnancial and economic crises, as well as
the average position of banks on the inverted-U curve, we infer that further diminution
of competition could negatively affect the innovation incentives of banks in the future.
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